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INSIDE LAWYERS:  
FRIENDS OR GATEKEEPERS? 
Sung Hui Kim* 
INTRODUCTION 
In February 2014, after an unprecedented eleven-year delay, General 
Motors Company (GM) announced a recall of 2.6 million vehicles due to a 
defective ignition switch.1  The ignition switch, which fell below GM’s 
own torque specifications, caused engines in certain Chevrolet Cobalt and 
Saturn Ion cars to stall even at highway speeds and disabled airbags while 
the cars were still in motion.2  By October 9, 2015, the number of deaths 
attributable to the faulty ignition switch had climbed to 124 and the number 
of injuries to 275.3  These tragic events prompt us to ask, once again, the 
question first posed by Judge Stanley Sporkin in the aftermath of the 
savings and loan debacles of the late 1980s:  Where were the lawyers?4  
Sadly, in GM’s case, the lawyers were right there.5  Though primary 
blame should perhaps rest with GM’s engineers, who apparently did not 
understand how their vehicles were built,6 GM’s inside lawyers,7 who 
 
*  Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.  I am grateful for comments on prior drafts from 
Iman Anabtawi, Oliver Budde, Bill Klein, Jim Fanto, Jim Park, Russell Pearce, Robert Eli 
Rosen, Laurel Terry, and participants at the Lawyering in the Regulatory State colloquium 
hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center for Law and Ethics.  Exemplary 
research assistance was provided by Shannon Goddard and UCLA’s world class research 
librarians.  For an overview of the colloquium, see Nancy J. Moore, Foreword:  Lawyering 
in the Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2016). 
 
 1. Sue Reisinger, The GM Lawyers Were Here, LAW.COM (July 1, 2014), 
http://www.law.com/sites/articles/2014/07/01/the-gm-lawyers-were-here/ [https://perma.cc/ 
YVF2-QMWK]. 
 2. ANTON VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS COMPANY 
REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS 1 (2014). 
 3. DETAILED OVERALL PROGRAM STATISTICS, GM IGNITION COMPENSATION CLAIMS 
RESOLUTION FACILITY (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.gmignitioncompensation.com/docs/ 
Program%20Statistics%20(2015-10-09).pdf [https://perma.cc/7M54-W233]. 
 4. See Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990) 
(“Where were these professionals . . . when these clearly improper transactions were being 
consummated?”). 
 5. Reisinger, supra note 1 (“The ignition switch debacle inevitably cast the legal team 
in a harsh light and led to the oft-repeated phrase:  Where were the lawyers?  Well, they 
were right here.”). 
 6. VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 2 (“A critical factor in GM personnel’s initial delay in 
fixing the switch was their failure to understand, quite simply, how the car was built.”). 
 7. This Article uses “inside lawyers” and “inside counsel” interchangeably to refer to 
corporate in-house counsel. 
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handled engineering, safety, and products liability issues, must be faulted 
for having obscured the deadly defect.  The report of the internal 
investigation conducted by Anton Valukas and commissioned by the GM 
board8 (“the Valukas Report”) provides important details.  As early as 
2005, the GM lawyers knew about the Cobalt’s tendency to stall while in 
motion, as contemporaneously reported by a barrage of negative press—
including from The New York Times and the Cleveland paper The Plain 
Dealer.9  As early as 2007, a Wisconsin State Patrol report that explicitly 
(and correctly) linked the defective ignition switch to an airbag failure in a 
fatal Cobalt collision entered the legal department’s files.10  And, as early 
as 2010, the lawyers understood that the Cobalt had a history of 
unaddressed airbag nondeployments in known fatalities and were warned 
by outside counsel that GM’s inaction could be interpreted as “egregious 
conduct” and subject GM to punitive damages.11 
Yet it was not until December 2013 that a GM lawyer finally notified 
GM’s general counsel that there was even an issue involving a potential 
recall,12 in spite of a written policy—in effect since 2003—that inside 
attorneys should bring serious, unaddressed problems, including significant 
safety issues, to the attention of the general counsel.13  What’s more, these 
lawyers were not low-level attorneys squirreled away in some rogue foreign 
branch office.  They were highly experienced and trusted lawyers located at 
GM’s headquarters, some of them in charge of committees tasked with 
making high-level settlement and product recall decisions.14  After the 
defect was fully communicated to the highest levels of the organization in 
January 2014,15 four of GM’s inside lawyers were terminated.16  In October 
2014, General Counsel Michael Millikin announced his resignation.17  With 
the dust now settled, the overwhelming picture that emerges of the GM 
lawyers is one of curious indifference. 
A decade ago, a wave of corporate scandals involving more reprehensible 
behavior but equally stunning examples of lawyer passivity motivated me 
to write about the role of inside lawyers.  In a series of articles, beginning in 
 
 8. VALUKAS, supra note 2. 
 9. Id. at 84–86. 
 10. Id. at 116–17.  None of GM’s lawyers or engineers working on Cobalt matters 
reported being aware of the Wisconsin State Patrol report until 2014. Id. at 118. 
 11. Id. at 10. 
 12. Id. at 211–13, 221, 224, 231.  On February 6, 2014, GM’s General Counsel learned 
about the specific facts relating to the Cobalt. Id. at 231. 
 13. Id. at 109–10. 
 14. See infra note 121 (discussing three GM lawyers). 
 15. VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 222–24. 
 16. The dismissed attorneys were:  Jennifer Sevigny, Head of GM’s Field Performance 
Assessment Group; Lawrence Buonomo, Practice Area Manager of Global Process & 
Litigation and Head of Product Litigation and Chair of the Settlement Review Committee; 
Michael Robinson, Vice President for Environmental, Sustainability and Global Regulatory 
Affairs and former General Counsel for GM North America; William Kemp, Counsel for 
Global Engineering Organization. Id. at 104–05, 158. 
 17. Bill Vlasic, In Surprise, Top Lawyer at G.M. Sets Retirement, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/18/business/michael-millikin-gms-top-lawyer-is-
retiring.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/P5GS-LCLR]. 
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2005 with The Banality of Fraud:  Re-Situating the Inside Counsel As 
Gatekeeper,18 I suggested that it was improper for lawyers to be mere 
bystanders while their client representatives violated their legal 
obligations,19 especially when such violations were directly responsible for 
gross harm inflicted on shareholders, employees, or third parties.  In The 
Banality of Fraud, I presented a diagnosis of the problem of inside lawyer 
acquiescence in corporate fraud, criticized the reforms ostensibly enacted to 
address the problem, and offered an alternative reform, which I believed 
squarely addressed the structural deficiencies identified in my diagnosis.20 
In making my arguments, I invoked the notion of a “gatekeeper,” which 
in the capital markets context I defined as a “private intermediar[y] who can 
prevent harm to the securities markets by disrupting the misconduct of [his 
or her] client representatives.”21  At the time, it was widely recognized that 
outside professional services providers, such as investment bankers, 
auditors, securities analysts, outside securities attorneys, and credit rating 
agencies, could perform gatekeeping functions that would benefit the 
securities markets.22  Less acknowledged and examined was the fact that 
inside lawyers could act as gatekeepers and possessed the capacity to stop 
corporate misconduct in its tracks, as Ronald Gilson first observed in his 
seminal article.23 
More recently, in a 2011 essay entitled Who Let You into the House?, 
Lawrence Hamermesh critiqued my reform and offered his 
counterproposal.24  His central claim and complaint was that my alternative 
reform would detrimentally impact the general counsel’s access to 
information by discouraging informal conversations with senior 
managers.25  To buttress his argument, Hamermesh invoked the analogy of 
“lawyer as friend,”26 an analogy made famous by Charles Fried in his 
 
 18. Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud:  Re-Situating the Inside Counsel As 
Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 985 (2005) [hereinafter Kim, Banality]; see also, e.g., 
Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (2008) [hereinafter Kim, 
Gatekeepers]; Sung Hui Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism in the Gatekeeping Wars, 63 SMU L. 
REV. 73 (2010) [hereinafter Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism]; Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest?  
Why the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L. REV. 129 (2011) [hereinafter Kim, 
Naked Self-Interest]. 
 19. By “violations,” I mean “material violation,” as defined by the SEC rules 
implementing Sarbanes-Oxley.  “Material violation” means a material violation of U.S. 
federal or state securities law, a material breach of fiduciary duty arising under any federal or 
state law, or a similar material violation of any federal or state law. 17 C.F.R. § 205.2(i) 
(2016). 
 20. See generally Kim, Banality, supra note 18. 
 21. Kim, Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 413. 
 22. Id. at 416. 
 23. Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession:  A Demand Side 
Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 884 (1990). 
 24. See generally Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Who Let You into the House?, 2012 WIS. L. 
REV. 359. 
 25. Id. at 373–74. 
 26. See id. at 376. 
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classic piece defending the moral praiseworthiness of the lawyer’s role.27  
By relying on this analogy, Hamermesh strongly suggested that inside 
lawyers should position themselves not so much as gatekeepers but as 
friends to corporate senior managers.28 
In this Article, I answer Hamermesh’s central complaint that, under my 
reform, “general counsel would lose the benefit of the informal 
communications from senior managers that invariably emerge in the context 
of a relationship of trust and confidence.”29  I argue that the empirical 
assumptions underlying Hamermesh’s complaint are not only unsupported 
and speculative but also reflect a poor understanding of corporate 
environments.  And even if we assume that Hamermesh’s prediction about 
general counsel’s access to information bears out, it is unlikely that his 
predicted costs would offset all other benefits to be gained from my reform, 
in particular, the enhanced willingness of inside counsel to interdict 
wrongdoing in serious cases. 
Turning to Hamermesh’s invocation of the “lawyer as friend” analogy, I 
argue that the notion of friendship elides the gravity of the relevant factual 
context and thus cannot provide useful guidance for how inside counsel 
should conduct themselves in the face of serious corporate wrongdoing.  
“Friendship” also mischaracterizes how employees ordinarily interact with 
one another in organizational settings and grossly misrepresents how some 
general counsel perceive their relations with senior managers and 
understand their fiduciary obligations to the corporate client.  Thus, as a 
model for inside counsel, the friendship analogy is strained, inapt, and 
should be avoided. 
Part I of this Article sets the stage by contrasting two alternative 
proposals to reform the inside lawyer’s role—my reform and Hamermesh’s 
counterreform.  Part II discusses the primary empirical disagreements 
between the two approaches.  Part III interrogates the propriety and the 
utility of invoking the “lawyer as friend” analogy as a model to guide inside 
counsel’s relationships with managers. 
I.  TWO ALTERNATIVE REFORMS 
In The Banality of Fraud, I argued that one could understand why inside 
lawyers acquiesce in fraud by combining insights from decades of social 
scientific research on the causes of unethical behavior with known facts 
about inside lawyers’ roles inside the corporation.30  Combining these 
insights and facts allows us to construct and analyze the “ethical ecology”31 
of inside counsel.  As I argued, this ethical ecology emerges from the 
 
 27. See Charles Fried, The Lawyer As Friend:  The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); see also infra notes 135–41 and accompanying 
text (discussing Fried’s article). 
 28. See infra notes 124–31 and accompanying text. 
 29. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 374. 
 30. Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at 1001–34. 
 31. See generally id. 
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multiple roles that inside lawyers inhabit.32  These roles, in turn, unleash 
psychological pressures that strongly affect the actions and choices of 
inside lawyers.33  In simplified terms, inside counsel act as “mere 
employees” subject to obedience pressures, as “faithful agents” subject to 
alignment pressures, and as “team players” subject to conformity 
pressures.34  These pressures explain why some inside lawyers turn a blind 
eye to unethical corporate behavior.  The following diagram illustrates, 
somewhat crudely, this complex ethical ecology. 
 
The Ethical Ecology of Inside Counsel 
 
Given my diagnosis, I was not sanguine about the reforms enacted in the 
aftermath of Enron to address the problem of lawyer acquiescence in 
fraud.35  However, in the spirit of scholarly experimentation and utility, I 
prodded readers to imagine what an alternative reform—one with “teeth” 
and responsive to the diagnosis presented—might look like.  Hence, in the 
last twenty-two pages of the article, I explained my tripartite alternative 
structural reform, which should mitigate some of the obedience, alignment, 
and conformity pressures arising out of inside counsel’s multiple roles.  The 
basic tenets of my reform were that 
(1) public companies transfer the oversight of the corporate legal 
department to a committee of independent board members; 
(2) the law guarantee whistle-blower protection to inside counsel under 
Sarbanes-Oxley and, accordingly, permit the disclosure of client 
confidences under any claim alleging retaliation under Sarbanes-
Oxley or a common law claim of retaliatory discharge; and 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 1034–40. 
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(3) public companies limit ex ante the amount of equity investments that 
an inside lawyer may accept as compensation or, in the alternative, 
fashion equity compensation in a manner that minimizes potential 
conflicts of interest.36 
To be clear, I was not so delusional as to think that any of my reforms 
would soon or ever be enacted (or that my reform would serve as a 
panacea).  Far-reaching reform that genuinely addresses deep structural 
problems, such as climate change or campaign finance, is rarely politically 
feasible—even after a major crisis or scandal.  Still, I believed, and 
continue to believe, that legal scholars should not be constrained in their 
writing to propose only that which is politically feasible in the moment.  
Indeed, it would be a sorry state of affairs if academics systematically 
limited themselves to minor tweaks to the status quo. 
Turning to Hamermesh’s critique of The Banality of Fraud, he took issue 
with my reforms, calling them “radical,”37 while neglecting to challenge 
any aspect of the diagnosis on which those reforms were based.  He was 
especially displeased with the proposal to “re-situat[e] control of general 
counsel’s hiring and supervision”38 to a “committee of independent board 
members who may be organized as the audit committee or a separate” 
Qualified Legal Compliance Committee, as defined in the regulations of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission39 (SEC).  That proposal was designed 
to mitigate inside lawyers’ obedience pressures and to redress the sad 
reality that many general counsel lack independent access to the board, as 
was demonstrably the case with Tyco’s former general counsel Mark 
Belnick.40  As radical as my proposal may have seemed at the time, similar 
proposals have been, and as recently as 2015 continue to be, embraced by 
other legal scholars.41  Incidentally, a similar restructuring has been widely 
adopted for chief compliance officers in the financial industry.42 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 367, 369, 372, 374, 386 (referring to my reform as 
“radical” on five occasions). 
 38. Id. at 374. 
 39. Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at 1055. 
 40. Id. at 1054. 
 41. See, e.g., Kabir Ahmed & Dezso Farkas, A Proposal to Encourage Up-The-Ladder 
Reporting by Insulating In-House Corporate Attorneys from Managerial Power, 39 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 861, 883 (2015) (“[T]he authors propose to modify the procedure for up-the-ladder 
reporting to bypass the CEO at every stage in the process. . . .  [T]he authors propose that a 
separate committee of the Board comprised of independent directors be made responsible for 
hiring the company’s CLO and the final approval over terminating the employment of the 
CLO and any corporate attorneys that work directly for the firm.”); Rutheford B. Campbell, 
Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, The Ethical Obligation of Transactional Lawyers to Act As 
Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9, 42 (2003); Jill E. Fisch & Kenneth M. Rosen, Is There 
a Role for Lawyers in Preventing Future Enrons?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1136 (2003); 
Robert Eli Rosen, Resistances to Reforming Corporate Governance:  The Diffusion of 
QLCCs, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1251, 1253 (2005).  Some proposals are less radical and more 
politically feasible, but nonetheless incorporate a mandatory element. See, e.g., Stephen M. 
Bainbridge & Christina J. Johnson, Managerialism, Legal Ethics, and Sarbanes-Oxley 
Section 307, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 299, 324 (“The SEC might have required . . . that the 
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Hamermesh admonished that “access and respect . . . would not be as 
readily accorded to a general counsel more generally perceived and situated 
as ‘cop’ or ‘gatekeeper.’”43  As a consequence, “general counsel would lose 
the benefit of the informal communications from senior managers,”44 
which—Hamermesh clarified—“is the central issue raised by [his] 
Essay.”45  In conclusion, Hamermesh declared:  “It certainly cannot be 
assumed that a radical alteration in the relationship between general counsel 
and senior management will have no impact on general counsel’s access to 
internal corporate information.”46 
 
audit committee and/or the board meet periodically with the general counsel outside the 
presence of other managers and inside directors.”). 
 42. James A. Fanto, Surveillant and Counselor:  A Reorientation in Compliance for 
Broker-Dealers, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1121, 1134–35.  Also, under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, for an organization to be deemed to have an effective ethics and compliance 
program for purposes of calculating the culpability score, 
[s]pecific individual(s) within the organization shall be delegated day-to-day 
operational responsibility for the compliance and ethics program.  Individual(s) 
with operational responsibility shall report periodically to high-level personnel 
and, as appropriate, to the governing authority, or an appropriate subgroup of the 
governing authority, on the effectiveness of the compliance and ethics program.  
To carry out such operational responsibility, such individual(s) shall be given 
adequate resources, appropriate authority, and direct access to the governing 
authority or an appropriate subgroup of the governing authority. 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (2014), 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2014/CHAPTER_8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U23D-WQNS]. 
 43. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 373. 
 44. Id. at 374. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.  This statement and others like it are straw men.  For another straw man, see id. at 
377 (“[I]t is at least as speculative to conclude that re-situating control of general counsel 
will have no effect on informal cooperation and sharing of information by management.”).  
In fact, I expressly acknowledged the possibility of negative consequences under my 
hypothetical reform. See Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at 1058–63 (noting potential 
objections to my proposed reform based on ineffectiveness, impracticability, and 
circumvention).  Additionally, I devoted an entire section in Gatekeepers Inside Out to the 
issue of how managers might circumvent both in-house and outside lawyers. See Kim, 
Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 457–60 (Part V).  Elsewhere, Hamermesh seems to 
acknowledge that I addressed these potential negative consequences in my article but 
neglects to respond to my specific arguments. See Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 373 
(“[Kim] explains the possibility that ‘corrupt’ senior management could simply choose not to 
consult with inside counsel, and thereby circumvent counsel’s gatekeeping influence.”). 
For yet another stark example of Hamermesh’s habit of mischaracterizing my arguments, 
see Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 374 & n.52 (“Kim quotes Professor Koniak for the 
proposition that ‘without lawyers, few corporate scandals would exist and fewer still would 
succeed long enough to cause any significant damage.’ . . .  Kim adds nothing to back up that 
remarkable statement.” (emphasis added)).  First, Hamermesh mischaracterizes the actual 
text for which Professor Koniak’s work was cited.  The actual statement for which I cited 
her work was other than what Hamermesh claims.  The actual statement was:  “[M]ost 
significant frauds require the cooperation or acquiescence from inside lawyers.” See Kim, 
Banality, supra note 18, at 1062 & n.481.  Second, Hamermesh misleadingly suggests that 
Koniak’s work was the sole source cited to support the text.  In fact, her work was just one 
of three sources cited in the specific footnote to support my statement. See id. at 1062 n.481.  
Third and more fundamentally, in light of the extensive social psychological evidence that I 
marshaled in The Banality of Fraud to demonstrate that acquiescence in fraud is banal, 
Hamermesh needs to either (i)  contest the evidence or (ii)  provide some explanation as to 
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If Hamermesh’s main point was to highlight that there may be trade-offs 
from adopting my reform, I could not agree more.  Indeed, it would be odd 
for any meaningful reform not to have trade-offs.  I expressly 
acknowledged some trade-offs, including the possibility that managers 
might avoid or circumvent inside lawyers.47  The important issue, of course, 
is not whether trade-offs exist but whether they are on net beneficial.  But I 
will defer that specific discussion to Part II below. 
The other possibility is that Hamermesh was presenting yet another tired 
defense of the status quo.  If so, we should not be surprised.  As William 
Simon observed, the most common response of the legal profession to any 
attempts at reform has been to “circl[e] the wagons” around traditional 
standards.48  Histories of congressional and regulatory attempts to impose 
even minimal responsibilities on lawyers to prevent client fraud reveal 
fierce and organized opposition from the American Bar Association and its 
state counterparts.49  Hamermesh’s essay may ultimately be just another 
example of this penchant for resisting outside regulation.  Predictably, 
Hamermesh displays the common judgmental biases that characterize the 
rhetoric of lawyers dodging regulation,50 including, among others, the 
omission bias (the systematic tendency to discount harms arising from 
inaction as opposed to action) and the status quo bias (the systematic 
tendency to prefer the current state of affairs to a different state of affairs).51 
Of course, apologists for the status quo never want to come off as 
apologists.  Accordingly, in lieu of my three measures, Hamermesh 
proposed an impressive seven measures, which, he claimed, would 
“promote general counsel’s independence and contribut[e] to effective 
corporate governance”52—without generating the types of negative 
consequences that might arise from adopting my reforms.  Those measures 
are 
(1) explicitly and continually identifying general counsel’s independence 
as a norm and expectation by consensus of both independent directors 
and senior managers; 
 
why lawyers would be more immune to the psychological pressures that I identified.  
Hamermesh does neither; instead, he simply asserts that it is “remarkable” that anyone 
would think that lawyers acquiesce in fraud to any significant degree.  Unfortunately, such a 
declaration is not an argument, let alone a rebuttal. 
 47. See Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at 1062–63. 
 48. William H. Simon, After Confidentiality:  Rethinking the Professional 
Responsibilities of the Business Lawyer, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1453, 1453 (2006). 
 49. See, e.g., Kim, Lawyer Exceptionalism, supra note 18, at 77–93 (Part I); Susan P. 
Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done:  The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1236 (2003); Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 11 (2002) [hereinafter Rhode & Paton I]; Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. 
Paton, Lawyers, Ethics, and Enron, in ENRON:  CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS 625, 645 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) [hereinafter 
Rhode & Paton II]. 
 50. For an analysis of the biases, see Kim, Naked Self-Interest, supra note 18. 
 51. Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision 
Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 593, 597 (2003). 
 52. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 379. 
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(2) involving independent directors in interviewing and evaluating 
general counsel candidates; 
(3) encouraging the CEO to consult with independent directors in 
selecting the general counsel; 
(4) encouraging the CEO to consult with independent directors in 
designing and revising the general counsel’s compensation package; 
(5) encouraging the CEO to establish a relationship with the general 
counsel in which the general counsel has direct access to the CEO, 
and in which the general counsel is expected to engage in an advisory 
function rather than simply manage delegation of responsibility for 
providing legal services to the corporation; 
(6) providing regular opportunities for the independent directors to 
consult with the general counsel in an “executive session,” outside the 
presence of the CEO and other senior managers; and 
(7) otherwise encouraging independent directors to consult with the 
general counsel, without the intervention of other senior managers.53 
It is quite possible that Hamermesh’s measures will generate no negative 
consequences.  But that is hardly the standard by which reform should be 
judged.  After all, one way in which a proposal might have no negative 
impact is by having no impact—good or bad.  When one glances at the 
verbs employed in Hamermesh’s measures (the principal verb being 
“encourag[e]”), one not only wonders whether these measures will have any 
impact but also whether that was the intention. 
Turning from his verbs to his omissions, Hamermesh categorically 
rejects any reform that addresses the structural forces likely to lead inside 
lawyers to succumb to psychological pressures in their multiple roles.54  He 
rejects any attempt to guarantee the general counsel formal independent 
access to the board, even though many inside counsel desire greater access 
to the board.55  Even creating a dotted line reporting relationship from the 
general counsel to a committee of independent directors would, no doubt, 
be seen as “too subversive.”  Additionally, he neglects to address the 
perverse incentive effects associated with compensating counsel in equity, 
which many legal academics believe to be problematic.56  Further, he fails 
 
 53. Id. at 362. 
 54. Id. at 361. 
 55. In a survey of 1216 in-house counsel conducted in 2003, “44 percent believed that 
better access to the board of directors was needed to ensure the well-being of their 
company.” Chad R. Brown, In-House Counsel Responsibilities in the Post-Enron 
Environment, ACCA DOCKET, May 2003, at 92, 97. 
 56. See, e.g., Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Responsibility:  Ensuring Independent Judgment 
of the General Counsel—A Look at Stock Options, 81 N.D. L. REV. 1 (2005); John S. 
Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in Lawyer Independence:  Lawyer Equity 
Investments in Clients, 81 TEX. L. REV. 405, 414 (2003); Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at 
1007 n.143 (reporting the views of Richard Painter and Susan Koniak); Donald C. 
Langevoort, When Lawyers and Law Firms Invest in Their Corporate Clients’ Stock, 80 
WASH. U. L.Q. 569, 570 (2002); Nancy J. Moore, Conflicts of Interest for In-House Counsel:  
Issues Emerging from the Expanding Role of the Attorney-Employee, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 497, 
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to even acknowledge the need to protect inside lawyers from retaliation, a 
measure favored by a chorus of legal academics57 as well as inside 
lawyers.58  This particular omission is troubling in light of recent findings 
that 21 percent of U.S. workers who reported misconduct at their workplace 
also reported suffering from retaliation.59 
The impotent verbs and the glaring omissions suggest that Hamermesh is 
advancing little more than a precatory laundry list of incremental best 
practices.60  While there is nothing inherently wrong with best practices, 
best practices do not have a strong track record of success with those 
companies representing the lion’s share of the problem—prominent, large-
capitalization companies widely known to have dysfunctional corporate 
cultures, such as GM, Enron, WorldCom, and, now, Volkswagen.61  For 
example, Jeffrey Gordon observed that Enron had implemented nearly all of 
the best practices proposed by corporate governance authorities—
“independent directors, specialized committees (especially an audit 
committee) consisting exclusively of independent directors to perform 
crucial monitoring functions, and clear charter of board authority,” as well 
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 61. See DENNIS B. BERESFORD ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE SPECIAL 
INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF WORLDCOM, INC. 18–24 (2003) 
(describing WorldCom’s corporate culture); Ronald R. Sims & Johannes Brinkmann, Enron 
Ethics (Or:  Culture Matters More than Codes), 45 J. BUS. ETHICS 243 (2003) (discussing 
the culture at Enron); Ben W. Heineman, Jr., GC and CEO Responsibility for GM’s 
Dysfunctional Culture, CORP. COUNS. ONLINE (June 6, 2014) (available online through Lexis 
Advance) (discussing GM’s “badly broken safety culture”); Jerry Useem, What Was 
Volkswagen Thinking?, ATLANTIC, Jan./Feb. 2016, at 26, 28, http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2016/01/what-was-volkswagen-thinking/419127/ (discussing culture in 
connection with the recent Volkswagen scandal) [https://perma.cc/8E5N-HA7T]. 
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as stock-based compensation for directors.62  Yet, the Enron board was 
“ineffectual in the most fundamental way, the Audit Committee particularly 
somnolent if not supine.”63  In these types of companies, making the banal 
recommendation that board members should pay more attention to their 
general counsel is not likely to do much.  As Eric Alden, a former equity 
partner of two AmLaw 100 law firms, predicted, “[Hamermesh’s] soft, 
precatory measures . . . would leave the status quo in effect unchanged.”64 
II.  EMPIRICAL DISAGREEMENTS 
As noted above, Hamermesh posited that “access and respect . . . would 
not be as readily accorded to a general counsel more generally perceived 
and situated as ‘cop’ or ‘gatekeeper.’”65  Accordingly, “[G]eneral counsel 
would lose the benefit of the informal communications from senior 
managers that invariably emerge in the context of a relationship of trust and 
confidence.”66  Hence, the crux of Hamermesh’s critique is his central 
prediction that, under my reform, the general counsel would lose access to 
information via informal communication channels.67  Part II explores this 
central prediction and the attendant empirical disagreements that ground our 
disparate approaches. 
Let me start off by noting that Hamermesh offers no direct or indirect 
empirical evidence to support the central prediction lying at the heart of his 
critique.68  Let me also concede that, given the paucity of relevant data on 
the subject, that omission is hardly cause for protest.  Less forgivably, 
however, Hamermesh offers no explicit theory to explain why or how 
transferring the oversight of the corporate legal department to a committee 
of independent board members should chill informal conversations between 
the general counsel and senior managers.  On close examination, it becomes 
clear that his central prediction is predicated on a vague and undefended 
behavioral assumption.69 
Hamermesh’s principal behavioral assumption is that general counsel’s 
demeanor would change once the reassignment takes place.70  According to 
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 68. There is one exception in which indirect evidence is arguably marshaled; 
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assumption. See Alden supra note 57, at 165 (“The structural centerpiece of [Hamermesh’s] 
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Hamermesh, managers will avoid a general counsel who is “actively 
independent,”71 “aggressively independent,”72 “distant,”73 and 
“adversarial”74—akin to a “cop”75 or an “adversarial monitor.”76  He 
doesn’t explain why this should occur or even what actively independent, as 
opposed to just independent, behavior looks like.  Does an “actively 
independent” or “adversarial” general counsel report up the ladder more 
frequently?  Apparently not, as Hamermesh explicitly denies that he is 
making any claims about the likelihood of reporting misconduct up the 
ladder.77  Without any explanation as to what “actively independent” or 
“adversarial” entails in terms of real behavior or why such alleged behavior 
should come about, we are left with the vague objection that the general 
counsel will respond to a reassignment in a way that would invariably be 
perceived as deeply alienating to senior managers, causing senior managers 
to clam up in the company of the general counsel. 
These types of vague and hyperbolic objections are not new.  In prior 
work analyzing the bar’s reactions to post-Enron calls for reform, I 
observed how the bar worried about lawyers being “‘overanxious,’ as 
‘cry[ing] wolf,’ . . . acting in an ‘imprudent and uninformed manner,’ and 
making ‘mountains’ out of ‘mole hills.’”78  In fact, I anticipated objections 
of this ilk when I first proposed my reform.  In The Banality of Fraud, I 
expressly addressed the concern that “an ambitious, overeducated, newly 
empowered, and more independent inside lawyer will become unduly 
confrontational and uncooperative, making frequent and unnecessary 
reports (‘false alarms’) to the board.”79  In response to this concern, I wrote: 
[I] believe that this scenario is very unlikely, precisely because there is no 
way to eliminate conformity pressures.  Pressures to be a “team player,” 
despite all of my reforms, will remain and persist substantially.  To the 
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extent that these pressures will reduce the likelihood of opportunistic and 
overly aggressive inside lawyer conduct, conformity pressures can be 
good.80 
No one, not even a director or lawyer, is immune to conformity pressures, 
which are automatically triggered by group membership and organizational 
settings.81  And no amount of redrawing of reporting lines can eliminate the 
team player pressures “to go along to get along” that are ubiquitous in 
corporate workplaces.82  Further, those pressures are likely to inhibit the 
dramatic change in the general counsel’s demeanor, a change that 
Hamermesh apparently assumes. 
Additionally, Hamermesh ignores the fact that, even under my reform, 
the general counsel can still be terminated.  Directors can still lose faith in 
the general counsel for all sorts of reasons, including for not being 
sufficiently creative in devising outside-the-box legal solutions to business 
problems or for simply being “obstreperous” and “difficult to work with.”  
And while in recent years directors have generally become more 
independent from the CEO, there are many companies in which boards still 
operate like rubber-stamps for the CEO83—a possibility that even 
Hamermesh acknowledges.84 
Also, Hamermesh conveniently ignores the available empirical evidence 
on the behavior of lawyers—evidence that tends to undermine his 
behavioral assumption.  For example, in 1985, sociologist Robert Nelson 
reported in his survey of 224 randomly selected lawyers that only 
approximately 16 percent of respondents reported ever having refused an 
assignment or potential work due to a conflict with their personal values 
(very broadly defined).85  And of the forty-six individuals who claimed to 
have refused work, only ten (out of 224) reported doing so because the 
client was committing a crime,86 and only one lawyer reported convincing a 
client not to proceed for ethical reasons.87  In another study of 787 
randomly selected lawyers conducted in 1995, John Heinz et al. reported 
that only 20 percent of lawyers working in law firms of over one hundred 
lawyers, and only 9 percent of inside lawyers, admitted to ever having 
refused an assignment due to a conflict with their personal values.88  In 
2004, Roger Cramton et al. observed, “[I]t is clear that the incidence of 
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whistleblowing by lawyers is astonishingly low given the fact that most or 
all states require disclosure when a crime or fraud has been perpetrated on a 
tribunal.”89  Perhaps most revealing, since 2002, lawyers “appearing and 
practicing before the [SEC] in any way in the representation of issuers”90 
have been granted the discretion to report out to the SEC, without the 
issuer’s consent, confidential information relating to unrectified material 
law violations.91  To date, no lawyer has reportedly done so.    The 
aforementioned empirical evidence suggests that the scenario of an unduly 
confrontational or “adversarial” general counsel is overblown. 
If the evidence on the behavior of lawyers does not persuade, perhaps the 
evidence on auditors will.  According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
“‘public watchdog’ function [of auditors] demands that the accountant 
maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires 
complete fidelity to the public trust.”92  Yet, the evidence to date suggests 
that even auditors rarely display so-called “actively independent” behavior.  
Since 1995, auditors have been under a statutory obligation to report to the 
SEC any unrectified law violations encountered in their work for public 
corporate clients.93  Given the number of public companies registered with 
the SEC—almost 12,000 by the end of 199994—one might expect the 
number of auditors reporting out law violations to be in the hundreds.  To 
the contrary, from 1995 to 2003, auditors reported only twenty-nine 
violations.95 
Of course, one could believe that lawyers and auditors do not report 
violations because there are so few violations to report.  But that belief 
seems contrary to what is generally known about the various forms of 
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organizational misconduct, including, for example, securities fraud.  While 
there is no way of ascertaining with any precision the total incidence of 
securities fraud, we do know that public company restatements of financial 
data, which reduce previously reported income, are not exactly rare.  From 
2003 to 2012, there were 2422 financial restatements announced by public 
companies in which the restatement reduced previously reported income, of 
which over 1300 were sufficiently material to have been reported on the 
SEC Form 8-K.96  Turning to other workplace infractions, survey evidence 
suggests that workplace ethical breaches are not uncommon.97  For 
example, in surveys conducted annually since 2000 by the Ethics Resource 
Center, between 41 and 55 percent of the employee-respondents98 reported 
that they had observed some type of misconduct in the workplace.99  We 
also know that other unethical behavior—e.g., cheating—is believed to be 
widespread.100  Several laboratory studies on cheating found that people 
tend to “cheat when given . . . an easy, unverifiable opportunity to do 
so.”101  A recent experiment conducted on bank professionals found that “a 
significant proportion” of these bankers cheated in a simple coin-flip 
experiment.102  With respect to consumer fraud in the United States, the 
Federal Trade Commission estimates that there were 37.8 million incidents 
of fraud in 2011, and Stanford University’s Financial Fraud Research 
Center estimates the annual cost of fraud to be over $52 billion.103  While 
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there is no way of knowing the actual frequency of material law violations, 
it seems naïve to think that they are uncommon. 
Hamermesh might reply that no one has a crystal ball, and thus it is 
impossible to accurately assess the impact of any reform.  Hence, even if 
his predicted costs are speculative, they still would be plausible.  I agree 
that those costs are plausible, as I acknowledged in The Banality of 
Fraud.104  But the fact that a particular reform has some plausible costs 
does not establish that reform’s disutility.  What is relevant is a reform’s net 
impact—whether the desirable effects of a reform outweigh the potentially 
undesirable ones of decreased information.  In other words, if we assume 
that the predicted costs (loss of some information containing the red flags of 
misconduct) will be incurred, would those costs likely offset all other 
benefits to be gained from my reform? 
To even begin to answer that question, it is necessary to situate those 
costs in the context of all other information sources.  As I observed in 
Gatekeepers Inside Out, information can flow through both informal and 
formal communication channels.105  In addition, inside counsel can learn of 
information from the perpetrators themselves or from other sources, e.g., 
other inside lawyers, outside vendors, or other employees.  By intersecting 
these insights, we see that critical information can be gained (1)  directly 
from perpetrators through informal communications; (2)  from 
nonperpetrators through informal communications; (3)  directly from 
perpetrators through formal communications; and (4)  from nonperpetrators 
through formal communications.  The following two-by-two matrix 
classifies the relevant information categories according to the sources of 
information (perpetrator vs. nonperpetrator) and their relevant modes of 
transmission (informal vs. formal).  These information categories are 
identified by their respective quadrants. 
 
 Perpetrators* Nonperpetrators** 
Informal 
Communications Quadrant I Quadrant II 
Formal 
Communications Quadrant III Quadrant IV 
 
*  Perpetrators are those principally engaged in the wrongdoing.  Hamermesh’s central prediction 
assumes the perpetrators are senior managers. 
 
**  Nonperpetrators include inside counsel, outside counsel, and other company employees who are 
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2016] INSIDE LAWYERS:  FRIENDS OR GATEKEEPERS? 1883 
The above matrix clarifies that Hamermesh’s central prediction—that 
there would be a decrease in informal communications between senior 
managers and the general counsel—narrowly concentrates on the 
information classified in a single quadrant, namely, Quadrant I 
(perpetrators, informal communications).  While it is plausible that there 
would be a decrease in Quadrant I information, it is only one category of 
information sources and may not even be the primary source of critical 
information for the general counsel. 
First, the general counsel could gain the critical information from formal 
or informal conversations with subordinate inside counsel or outside 
lawyers (Quadrants II and IV).  In larger companies with larger legal 
budgets, the general counsel will not handle all legal risks posed, nor will 
she be the sole legal mind involved in discussions.  Much legal work will be 
delegated to subordinate inside counsel as well as outside lawyers, some of 
whom may have closer access to the relevant facts.  For example, the 
Valukas Report found that many of GM’s subordinate inside and outside 
lawyers handled cases involving ignition switch and airbag nondeployment 
problems in fatal collisions but failed to link the two problems.106  Because 
the general counsel is likely to have routine interactions with members of 
her legal department, this may be the primary source of critical information 
for the general counsel. 
Second, the general counsel could gain the critical information from 
formal or informal conversations with other employees not directly 
involved in the misconduct, including employees staffed in the company’s 
compliance, internal audit, or risk departments, as well as other employees 
who may be incidental victims of wrongdoing (Quadrants II and IV).  For 
example, Cynthia Cooper, the former Vice President of Internal Audit and 
famed whistleblower at WorldCom, initially learned in 2002 about 
WorldCom’s fraudulent accounting practices not from the perpetrator of the 
fraud (CFO Scott Sullivan) but from one of its victims.  That victim 
happened to be a manager in the wireless division who told Cooper that 
corporate accounting had taken $400 million out of his reserve account and 
used it to boost WorldCom’s income.107  Moreover, this manager was not 
alone in his knowledge of the misdeed.  WorldCom’s investigative report 
observed that “[n]umerous individuals—most of them in financial and 
accounting departments, at many levels of the Company and in different 
locations around the world—became aware in varying degrees of senior 
management’s misconduct.”108  Hamermesh’s myopic focus on informal 
communications emanating from the perpetrator ignores the fact that the 
corporate scandals publicized at the turn of the century were predominantly 
transgressions facilitated by groups of top executives and their advisors, 
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rather than isolated individuals.109  Group transgressions are naturally 
harder to conceal from colleagues within the company. 
Third, the general counsel could glean the critical information from 
formal discussions with senior managers (Quadrant III).  After all, 
managers do not consult inside counsel out of a desire to widen their social 
network; they consult inside lawyers because their jobs often require them 
to do so.  In some cases, such as in Enron’s off-balance sheet structured 
finance transactions where lawyers drafted the relevant documents and 
provided legal opinions, legal assistance may be necessary to perpetrate the 
illegal scheme in the first place.110  In those situations, managers have some 
built-in incentive to err on the side of more disclosure.  If the manager lies 
or withholds critical information from inside counsel in an effort to conceal 
wrongdoing, he also risks receiving inadequate legal help at his own peril.  
Inside lawyers can gain important information during formal discussions 
by, for example, interrogating the purpose of the proposed scheme.  For 
example, if Kristina Mordaunt, a former Enron senior inside attorney, had 
genuinely inquired about the purpose of the fraudulent LJM1/Rhythms 
Hedging Transaction that was brought to her attention, she might have 
learned that it was a “hedge for financial accounting purposes only, lacking 
any economic substance or rational business purpose, but was intended by 
certain Enron officers to manipulate Enron’s financial statements.”111  In 
other cases, legal assistance may not be necessary to the scheme, such as in 
a pure accounting fraud, but an adept lawyer, i.e., one who pays attention to 
financial issues and has a good “spider sense,” may still be able to catch 
wind that something is awry.  The point is that inside counsel can still gain 
important information during formal consultations and meetings. 
That said, we do not actually know the underlying rate at which 
perpetrators reveal critical information directly to their inside lawyers—
either formally or informally.  Whether perpetrators do so in any given case 
will depend on the nature of the wrongdoing (e.g., the degree to which legal 
assistance is necessary) and the perpetrator’s state of mind (e.g., intentional 
vs. reckless), as well as other characteristics of the perpetrator (e.g., 
loquacious vs. reticent).  With respect to intentional misconduct, it is 
unclear whether the amount of critical information ordinarily revealed to 
inside lawyers would be of threshold significance.  As Stephen Bainbridge 
and Christina Johnson have noted, “Managers who intentionally commit 
fraud or breaches of fiduciary duty will only rarely consult their legal 
counsel.”112  And even honest mistakes in judgment may never be 
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acknowledged by the perpetrator.  For example, Raymond DeGiorgio, the 
GM engineer who originally approved the substandard ignition switch in 
2002 and then covertly replaced it in 2006,113 never admitted to anything—
let alone confessed anything to GM’s general counsel.  Even when 
DeGiorgio was confronted during a deposition in 2013 with 
incontrovertible evidence of his colossal errors, he simply testified that he 
could not remember.114  Therefore, it is not clear whether the particular 
information costs pointed out by Hamermesh are even significant enough 
for policymakers to be seriously concerned. 
But even if we assume that the information disclosed directly by 
perpetrators reaches threshold significance, any decrease in such 
information is unlikely to outweigh all other benefits to be gained from my 
reform.  One such benefit may be an increase in the flow of information 
from nonperpetrators to inside counsel.  To the extent that redirecting 
oversight of the legal department conveys the strong message to company 
employees that the board takes compliance very seriously, employees may 
be more willing to come forward with critical information. 
Another (and perhaps more important) likely benefit of my reform is the 
enhanced willingness by the general counsel to intervene in cases of 
suspected managerial wrongdoing.  Under my reform, the general counsel 
is legally protected from retaliation and has at least formal independent 
access to the board.115  As a result, she should feel more emboldened to 
confront the wrongdoing manager or to take a report of evidence of a 
material violation to the board.  Under Hamermesh’s reform, the general 
counsel has none of these protections and thus remains quite vulnerable 
should she confront the wrongdoing manager. 
Alden highlighted how important it is for policymakers to understand the 
structural forces that frame this moment of ethical choice for inside lawyers.  
Lambasting Hamermesh’s reforms for not legally protecting inside counsel 
from retaliation, Alden noted: 
[P]recisely the situation for which one must be prepared, precisely the 
situation for which protective rules are implemented, is 
the . . . unfortunate case where senior business managers know very well 
what they are doing and are determined to proceed with an illegal course 
of conduct in the pursuit of advantage.  This is the acid test.  This is when 
it counts.  This is when you need corporate counsel with the intestinal 
fortitude and practical ability to say, “Stop.”  The last thing in the world 
one wants at this juncture is cringing, sycophantic, pliable counsel unable 
or unwilling, due to an entirely justified fear of termination and the 
tremendous personal consequences which can easily and foreseeably flow 
therefrom, to assert themselves successfully against determined, corrupt 
senior managers engaged or proposing to engage in illegal conduct.116 
 
 113. VALUKAS, supra note 2, at 51, 98–100, 101 n.416. 
 114. Id. at 199. 
 115. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 116. Alden, supra note 57, at 165–66. 
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As the above passage suggests, saying “stop” is not as easy as people 
assume.  To be sure, some inside counsel will have the gumption to say 
“stop” under any regulatory regime.  But for many others, such as former 
Apple General Counsel Nancy Heinen117 and the more than twenty other 
former inside counsel who were fired, demoted, or forced to resign amidst 
investigations or allegations that they had acquiesced in the backdating of 
managerial stock options,118 saying “stop” to the senior manager was 
apparently not so easy.  For these critical moments, hoping that boards have 
heeded Hamermesh’s advice to “continually identify[] general counsel’s 
independence as a norm”119 will not stop the train wreck. 
Hamermesh’s reform fails because it is based on a faulty diagnosis—that 
insufficient access to information poses the greatest threat to inside 
counsel’s gatekeeping abilities.  But, as I suggested in prior work, it is not 
so much the lack of information (i.e., the “capacity to monitor”), but rather 
the unwillingness to interdict, that poses the greatest obstacle for inside 
counsel gatekeepers.120  And these observations, I believe, would still 
generally hold true even under my alternative reform.  It is noteworthy that 
the GM lawyers implicated in the scandal did not suffer from lack of access 
to information about the existence of a problem but from a marked 
unwillingness to rock the boat in an effort to solve the problem before 
them.121  When GM’s CEO Mary Barra finally announced the removal of 
these employees, she did not complain that her lawyers were poorly 
informed.  Rather, she stated that they “simply didn’t do enough:  they 
didn’t take responsibility; didn’t act with any sense of urgency.”122  On the 
more pressing problem of inside counsel’s unwillingness to interdict, 
Hamermesh’s reform does little to change the structure on which inside 
counsel’s incentives to interdict are grafted.  My alternative reform is more 
likely to enable the general counsel to take an ethical stand precisely when 
it counts. 
 
 117. SEC, LITIGATION RELEASE NO. 20683, SEC SETTLES OPTIONS BACKDATING CHARGES 
WITH FORMER APPLE GENERAL COUNSEL FOR $2.2 MILLION (2008), https://www.sec.gov/ 
litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20683.htm [http://perma.cc/KCC7-LVNW]. 
 118. See Yuri Mikulka & John M. Horan, General Counsel Under Attack:  Criminal and 
Enforcement Proceedings, Investigations, and the Travails of In-House Counsel, AM. BAR 
ASS’N (Oct. 17, 2007), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/corporate/docs/ 
2007_materials_underattack.pdf (identifying seventy-seven inside counsel targeted in 
criminal and enforcement proceedings and investigations and identifying counsel implicated 
in options backdating) [https://perma.cc/797F-CX6S]. 
 119. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 379. 
 120. See Kim, Gatekeepers, supra note 18, at 457, 460–61. 
 121. Lawrence Buonomo, Head of Product Litigation and, since 2012, Chair of the Legal 
Review Committee that decided settlements, “saw numerous fatal crash cases pass before 
him”; William Kemp, Counsel for GM’s Global Engineering Organization, was a member of 
that same committee since 2006 and as early as 2004 was involved in ignition switch 
problems; Jennifer Sevigny, Head of GM’s Field Performance Assessment Group, worked 
on assessments of the ignition switch problem. Sue Reisinger, GM In-House Lawyers 
‘Removed’ in Ignition-Switch Purge, CORP. COUNS. ONLINE (June 9, 2014) (available online 
through Lexis Advance). 
 122. Id. 
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In sum, the principal behavioral assumption on which Hamermesh’s 
central prediction rests—that the general counsel will become appreciably 
“adversarial” in the ordinary course—is far-fetched.  As a consequence, the 
central prediction on which his critique is based—that there would be a 
decrease in informal communications between senior managers and the 
general counsel as a response to a perceived change in the general counsel’s 
demeanor—remains speculative.  And even assuming that his central 
prediction bears out, information disclosed directly by the perpetrators 
themselves is only one source of information and may not even be of 
threshold significance.  Accordingly, any decrease in such information is 
unlikely to outweigh all the other benefits to be gained from my reform—
foremost of which is the increase in counsel’s willingness to interdict when 
faced with evidence of a material breach in legal obligations. 
III.  COMPETING VISIONS 
Above I described the basic empirical disagreements underlying our two 
proposals.  But perhaps these empirical disagreements mask the deeper 
philosophical differences between our disparate approaches.  Indeed, our 
respective reforms are animated by two different understandings of the 
inside counsel role.  In this part, I critique the “lawyer as friend” analogy 
that inspires Hamermesh’s vision for the role of inside lawyers.  Along the 
way, I describe an alternative vision—“lawyer as gatekeeper”—a vision 
demonstrably espoused by the respondents in Tanina Rostain’s 2008 pilot 
empirical study of the general counsel of ten blue-chip companies.123 
Hamermesh invokes the “lawyer as friend” analogy explicitly in two 
rhetorical questions, which he believed definitively resolved the principal 
empirical issues raised by our respective proposals: 
(1) [I]n a situation involving potentially adverse regulatory consequences 
(e.g., financial penalties or even imprisonment), is it more 
comfortable, other things being equal, to share personal and 
confidential information about the situation with a policeman or 
regulator or with a close friend?124 
(2) [I]s a suggestion that some course of conduct may be improper and 
should be avoided more likely to be accepted and internalized if 
received from a close friend, or from someone perceived as an 
enforcer whose incentives include avoiding potential liability for any 
failure to stop improper conduct?125 
Hamermesh also invokes the analogy implicitly, by repeatedly suggesting 
that “trust and confidence,” “trust,” “trust and respect,” or “intimacy” are 
the primary reasons why employees share confidential corporate 
information.126  In fact, “trust” or “trust and confidence” is invoked 
 
 123. See generally Rostain, supra note 95. 
 124. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 376 (emphasis added). 
 125. Id. at 378 (emphasis added). 
 126. See, e.g., id. at 359, 368, 374–76. 
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eighteen times in his essay.127  As the senior manager’s close friend, the 
inside lawyer’s principal role remains that of giving advice; indeed, 
Hamermesh seems to privilege the advice-giving function of inside lawyers 
above all other functions.128  Hamermesh recommends that general counsel 
cultivate “an active advisory relationship of trust and confidence with senior 
management”129 such that managers will come to regard the general 
counsel as the “persuasive counselor.”130  Hamermesh urges boards to 
encourage “a relationship in which the general counsel is expected to 
engage in an advisory function with the CEO and other senior officers.”131 
Of course, the friendship analogy is a familiar one, especially for legal 
ethicists.  Simon observed that the friendship analogy may have surfaced as 
early as the seventeenth century as a justification for the attorney-client 
privilege in the law of evidence.132  As it was understood then, the rule 
mandating confidentiality followed from the more general principle that 
“gentlemen do not reveal each other’s confidences.”133  And analogies to 
friendship have been invoked in legal articles dating back to the 1950s.134 
The first formal defense of friendship as the proper model for the lawyer-
client relationship occurred in 1976, when Charles Fried published The 
Lawyer As Friend:  The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client 
Relation.135  In the essay, Fried defended the moral praiseworthiness of 
lawyers serving their clients by drawing an analogy to friends helping 
friends.136  Just as ordinary individuals are morally justified in preferring 
the interests of their friends and family over everyone else, Fried argued, 
lawyers are morally justified in preferring their clients’ interests over those 
of the “wider collectivity”—third parties or the public at large.137  The 
moral right of individuals to lavish care on close others, even at the expense 
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of distant others, Fried argued, was integral to preserving the fundamental 
moral interests of personality, identity, and liberty.138 
Fried’s arguments have proven controversial.139  Indeed, the friendship 
analogy has been deftly criticized on both normative140 and descriptive 
grounds.141  Here is not the place to weigh in on the debate and further 
interrogate the propriety or utility of the analogy as applied to the legal 
profession as a whole.  Suffice it to say that, for purposes of this Article, 
Hamermesh’s invocation of the friendship analogy seems particularly inapt 
for the in-house role and the types of factual scenarios specifically invoked 
by Hamermesh and contemplated by our respective reforms. 
First, friendship poorly reflects what inside lawyers should do if and 
when faced with serious managerial misconduct.  On these occasions, 
Hamermesh recommends that the lawyer should invite the wrongdoing 
manager’s “trust and confidence” in the lawyer to afford the lawyer ample 
opportunity to dissuade the manager from proceeding with his illicit plans.  
I agree that the first thing that lawyers should do in such a scenario is to 
attempt to dissuade the manager from doing wrong.  But on what basis is it 
appropriate for the lawyer to invite the manager’s trust and confidence?  
Although Hamermesh repeatedly invokes “trust and confidence” as the 
main inducement for the manager’s voluntary disclosure to the lawyer,142 
he does not answer the critical question that is raised:  Trust and confidence 
in what? 
As a matter of professional responsibility and fiduciary obligation, the 
lawyer cannot reassure the manager that his communication will remain 
confidential143 or that the manager will be shielded from adverse 
consequences.144  After all, that manager will usually not be entitled to 
those assurances.  As Simon explained, “[The] authority to invoke or waive 
the organization’s confidentiality rights usually belongs to organizational 
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agents different from those who made the confidential communications.”145  
If the manager is actively planning or engaging in material breaches of legal 
obligation, he is acting disloyally and likely exposing the organization to 
significant legal liability.  Hence, that manager is legally adverse to the 
organization and its lawyers with whom he now has an active conflict of 
interest.  Because the lawyer may be required to report the conversation up 
the ladder to the board,146 or even be required to testify against the manager 
in a court of law,147 it would be entirely inappropriate for the lawyer to 
reassure her colleague of her continuing loyalty or confidentiality.  Contrary 
to what has been implicitly suggested, the lawyer’s duty of 
“[c]onfidentiality will not block disclosure within the organization, and it 
will not prevent the organization from disclosing outside, no matter how 
harmful internal or external disclosure is to the [manager].”148 
Indeed, the leading treatise on in-house practice advises inside counsel in 
these sticky situations to tread lightly and give the manager a “‘corporate 
Miranda warning,’ which puts the manager on notice that counsel owes a 
duty of loyalty to the company alone (and not to any manager) and thus 
cannot promise confidentiality or loyalty to any individual manager.”149  To 
suggest that inside lawyers position themselves as close friends and invite 
the wrongdoing manager’s (continued) trust and confidence not only 
ignores the legally adverse nature of the lawyer-manager relationship but 
also contradicts what are widely accepted as “best practices” for inside 
counsel.  In these types of situations, the only thing that the lawyer can 
properly promise the manager is that she will listen carefully and not rush to 
judgment, which is the behavior that anyone would reasonably expect of a 
competent professional (irrespective of any preexisting friendship). 
Of course, it is certainly possible that the lawyer will successfully 
dissuade the manager from going forward with his illicit plan.  This good 
result may be reached through some form of moral dialogue that 
Hamermesh and others are right to recommend.150  What Hamermesh 
blithely ignores, however, is the sobering reality that persuasion does not 
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always work.  Not all lawyers will be skillful in the art of moral suasion, 
and sophisticated senior managers, who find themselves in desperate 
enough situations to be considering wrongdoing in the first place, may not 
be receptive to it.151  Sometimes the only option available to the lawyer is 
to issue a stern warning that higher-ups may need to be alerted.152  As Elihu 
Root put it, “About half the practice of a decent lawyer consists in telling 
would-be clients that they are damned fools and should stop.”153  And, even 
if the manager does back down, Hamermesh is wrong to assume that this is 
where the lawyer’s duty to escalate necessarily ends:  the inside lawyer may 
still have an organizational duty or expectation to report the conversation up 
the ladder, if in her considered judgment she believes that the manager 
continues to pose a threat to the organization.154 
Second, as a descriptive matter, friendship does not accurately portray 
how some general counsel perceive their role and their relationship with 
senior managers.  In particular, the notion of friendship discounts, if not 
entirely ignores, the general counsel’s gatekeeping function and the 
seriousness with which general counsel regard their legal obligation to 
protect the organization from harm.  In many companies, “inside counsel 
are intentionally carved into corporate decision-making process to constrain 
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managerial discretion and safeguard the company from legal trouble.”155  
While providing disinterested advice to business managers is a valuable 
function of the in-house role, it is not the only—and may not be the most 
important—function.  Inside counsel not only advise others but also act,156 
and their actions can have as much legal significance as the actions of their 
business coagents.  Furthermore, “inside counsel often have direct 
responsibility over compliance and are expected to intervene when 
significant legal risks are at stake.”157  In the best companies, inside counsel 
do not take that responsibility lightly. 
For example, the general counsel respondents in Rostain’s 2008 study 
“articulated a robust account of their jurisdiction over questions of legal 
risk.”158  They were not resigned to playing the role of mere advisors-for-
hire—giving advice and then looking the other way.  Instead, her 
respondents “were unanimous in insisting that responsibility for 
determining the appropriate level of risk to be undertaken by their 
companies lay with them.”159  They characterized their gatekeeping 
functions “in very strong terms” and were “confident of their capacity to 
stop deals that they believed posed significant legal risks to the 
company.”160  Although they occasionally judged it appropriate to cede the 
final call on low-level risks to managers, these general counsel “were the 
ultimate arbiters of which risks were negotiable and which were not,”161 
and they professed a willingness to say “no” in situations implicating 
significant civil or criminal liability.162  In short, these general counsel 
expressed an alternative vision to the “lawyer as friend.”  Indeed, they were 
strong exemplars of the “lawyer as gatekeeper.” 
To be sure, not all inside lawyers exercise their gatekeeping functions as 
robustly as the general counsel in Rostain’s study.  One reason for this is 
that many inside counsel are not sheltered by employment agreements163 
and thus remain economically vulnerable to their client representatives.  
This economic vulnerability provides the third reason why Hamermesh’s 
friendship analogy is malapropos.  As I noted in The Banality of Fraud: 
 First, inside counsel are necessarily economically dependent on a 
single client.  If they get fired, they lose their entire income, their 
insurance, and their basic livelihood.  If pensions or stock options have 
not vested, then enormous sums of money can be forfeited as well.  Even 
worse, if they get fired for whistleblowing, they may get blacklisted—
without recourse under the law to sue for retaliatory discharge. 
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 Second, even if getting fired is not likely, inside counsel feels 
unremitting pressure to justify herself and her department as a corporate 
cost center.  In today’s competitive and profit-oriented environment, no 
position feels completely secure, and the case that an adequate return on 
firm investment is being achieved must always be made.  The best way to 
do so is to facilitate, not interfere with, corporate transactions favored by 
management.164 
The typical friendship is not characterized by this degree of economic 
vulnerability or dependency.  Stated another way, by invoking “friendship,” 
Hamermesh too casually dismisses important aspects of the lawyer-client 
relationship, namely, the prominent role of money.  As Simon observed in 
his critique of Lawyer As Friend, “[I]f Fried’s definition is amplified to 
reflect the qualification . . . that the lawyer adopts the client’s interests for 
money, it becomes apparent that Fried has described the classical notion, 
not of friendship, but of prostitution.”165  Not only does Hamermesh ignore 
the economic vulnerability of inside counsel but he also ignores its potential 
ethical consequences.  As Max Bazerman and Ann Tenbrunsel explain in 
their discussion of “motivated blindness,” a “core finding of behavioral 
ethics” is that “if you are motivated to turn a blind eye to someone’s 
unethical behavior, you won’t see it,” even when you regard yourself as 
honest.166 
Fourth, encouraging lawyers to serve as managers’ close friends 
exacerbates enduring psychological pressures to overlook wrongdoing in an 
effort to reduce cognitive dissonance.167  As Deborah Rhode and Paul Paton 
noted: 
To reduce the cognitive dissonance, lawyers will often unconsciously 
dismiss or discount evidence of misconduct and its impact on third 
parties.  The risks of such dissonance are exacerbated when lawyers bond 
socially and professionally with the client’s management team.  The more 
that counsel blends into the culture of corporate insiders, the greater the 
pressures of cohesiveness.  That, in turn, encourages lawyers to 
underestimate risk and to suppress compromising information in order to 
preserve internal solidarity.  Yet, in the long run, this dynamic ill serves 
all concerned.  Clients lose access to disinterested advice about their own 
liability; lawyers lose capacity for independent judgment and moral 
autonomy; and the public loses protection from organizational 
misconduct.  Enron is a case history of all those costs.168 
Hence, Hamermesh’s recommendation that inside lawyers pose as 
managers’ close friends may perversely lead to greater, not less, 
acquiescence in managerial misconduct. 
 
 164. Kim, Banality, supra note 18, at 1005–06. 
 165. Simon, supra note 132, at 108. 
 166. BAZERMAN & TENBRUNSEL, supra note 101, at 81. 
 167. Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that when a person exhibits behavior that 
seems inconsistent with her prior attitudes such that psychic unrest is aroused, her internal 
attitudes will shift to generate greater alignment with her outward behavior. See Kim, Naked 
Self-Interest, supra note 18, at 146–48 (describing cognitive dissonance theory). 
 168. Rhode & Paton I, supra note 49, at 32. 
1894 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
The friendship analogy is not just ill-suited to situations of managerial 
misconduct.  The fifth reason for rejecting the analogy is that it 
mischaracterizes the ordinary, default understanding of employee 
relationships and the more formal nature of office interactions in most 
corporate settings.  Of course, friendships can and do arise in office settings 
and, yes, lawyers can and do find friends among their nonlawyer 
colleagues.169  But friendship is by no means the primary mode of office 
interactions.  To briefly illustrate this point, let us turn to the sole piece of 
evidence cited by Hamermesh to support his central empirical prediction 
that the “general counsel would lose the benefit of the informal 
communications from senior managers.”170  Hamermesh first promises that 
his prediction will bear out because “[t]here is evidence . . . both anecdotal 
and more sweeping, that access to information correlates directly with the 
level of trust and confidence reposed by the source with the recipient.”171  
While withholding the so-called “sweeping” evidence of such correlation, 
Hamermesh proceeds to offer his “anecdotal” evidence in a single footnote: 
See, e.g., Stan Schroeder, Facebook Privacy:  10 Settings Every User 
Needs to Know, MASHABLE.COM (Feb. 7, 2011), http:// 
mashable.com/2011/02/07/facebook-privacy-guide/ (“[Y]ou might want 
to customize the settings and set a certain type of content to be visible to 
the people on some of your lists, and invisible to others.  For example, 
only my close friends can see all my photos, while business associates can 
see just a few.”).172 
The above internet blogpost explains how a single user customizes his 
Facebook settings.  If this blogpost supports anything, it likely supports a 
proposition that undermines Hamermesh’s point:  that managers do not 
ordinarily think of their office colleagues (including lawyers) as friends.  
According to this blogger, “[O]nly my close friends can see all my photos, 
while business associates can see just a few.”173  It must have escaped 
Hamermesh’s attention that inside lawyers would more readily be classified 
as “business associates” than as “close friends.” 
Finally, not only does Hamermesh’s “lawyer as friend” vision poorly 
describe the default mode of office interactions but, as specifically 
portrayed by Hamermesh, the vision is also inconsistent with the notion of 
friendship itself.  Hamermesh’s recommendation that inside counsel act as 
“close friends” of senior managers is predicated on the promise that inside 
counsel will not only be able to gain access to information but also will gain 
 
 169. Cf. Condlin, supra note 139, at 296–97 (“It is not that lawyers and clients can never 
be friends, but just that when they are it will be because of qualities independent of their 
status as lawyers and clients.  Put another way, lawyers and clients will be friends when they 
would be friends if they were not lawyers and clients; being lawyers and clients has nothing 
to do with forming friendships, one way or the other.”). 
 170. Hamermesh, supra note 24, at 374. 
 171. Id. at 375 (emphasis added). 
 172. Id. at 375 n.57 (emphasis added). 
 173. Id. (emphasis added). 
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“respect,” “stature,” and “authority” within the company.174  Hamermesh 
writes: 
The general counsel’s ability to achieve the stature and access to 
information enabling her to most effectively counsel the corporation is 
widely and plausibly viewed as dependent on the establishment of a close 
working relationship with the CEO[;] a direct and close relationship with 
the CEO can only enhance the general counsel’s stature and authority 
within the company, not to mention her or his access to corporate strategy 
development and critical internal information[;] . . . [e]stablishing a direct 
relationship between general counsel and independent directors is also 
likely to enhance general counsel’s stature.175 
The reasons offered by Hamermesh for following his advice are self-serving 
and careerist; they seem opportunistic and deeply inconsistent with the 
notion of friendship.176 
In sum, Hamermesh’s plea that inside lawyers position themselves as 
close friends ignores the legally adverse status of malfeasant managers in 
the relevant contexts and contradicts established best practices.  It does not 
accurately portray how many general counsel understand their relationships 
with senior managers and too heavily discounts the gravity with which 
some general counsel perceive their gatekeeping function.  At the same 
time, it ignores the economic vulnerability of many inside counsel and the 
related phenomenon of motivated blindness, trivializing financial pressures 
to acquiesce in misconduct.  And it ignores the very real psychological 
pressures to overlook wrongdoing in an effort to reduce cognitive 
dissonance.  It also badly mischaracterizes the default way in which 
corporate employees interact with one another in office settings.  By 
assuming that friendship is the governing norm in office suites, Hamermesh 
confuses friendship with friendliness177 and confuses corporate workplaces 
with college fraternities.  Moreover, Hamermesh’s prescription that inside 
lawyers pose as friends of management for instrumental self-serving benefit 
undermines the very notion of friendship itself. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite the inaptness of the “lawyer as friend” vision, that vision is 
superficially appealing and may even have guided the conduct of the GM 
 
 174. Id. at 382–83. 
 175. Id. (emphasis added). 
 176. Cf. Condlin, supra note 139, at 267 (“True friendship is based principally on love 
rather than self-interest.  While there are utilitarian dimensions to friendship, true friends are 
loved for their own sake and for the goodness of their character, not for the advantage they 
can help one realize.”). 
 177. See, e.g., Condlin, supra note 139, at 294–95 (“Friendliness is simply a social 
practice designed to make day-to-day interaction pleasant and efficient by removing the 
friction produced by overinterpretation of the other’s motives.  One can be friendly toward 
anyone, even an enemy, under just about any circumstances, and should be most of the time, 
but one can be a friend to someone only under the demanding conditions described above, 
and even then, only when the other person wants to be a friend in return, and is willing to 
invest the time and energy needed to develop the relationship.”). 
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lawyers.  According to the Valukas Report, in a 2012 meeting about the 
nondeployment of a Cobalt airbag, a junior GM lawyer inquired whether 
there should be a recall.  He was promptly “told that the issue had already 
been raised with engineering, that the engineers were working on it, and 
that they had not come up with a solution.”178  The junior lawyer reportedly 
“got the ‘vibe’ that the lawyers had ‘done everything [they could] do.’”179  
This behavior is entirely consistent with the “lawyer as friend” vision, 
which posits that the lawyer’s role is merely to facilitate the autonomous 
decisionmaking of other individuals. Under this vision, the problems with 
the Cobalt essentially belonged to someone else (i.e., the engineers).  
Accordingly, so long as the GM lawyers flagged the legal risks to 
responsible engineers and made themselves available to provide 
confidential advice, they had discharged their “friendship” responsibilities 
in full. 
By all accounts, the notoriously ineffective GM lawyers had been 
regarded as trustworthy friends.  Three of the four terminated GM lawyers 
were longstanding employees who each served thirty years at GM before 
being removed.180  And one of those longstanding GM lawyers was 
William Kemp, GM’s lead engineering and safety lawyer.  According to the 
Valukas Report, Kemp was “widely regarded as GM’s most 
knowledgeable, experienced and trusted safety lawyer.”181  Yet, it was this 
most trusted lawyer who failed to protect GM, its customers, and its 
reputation.  As early as 2004, Kemp negotiated with the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration over the problem of moving stalls in GM’s 
vehicles.182  He also orchestrated GM’s in-house investigation of the 
defective ignition switch for more than two years prior to the recall.183  
When finally asked during the internal investigation about why he waited so 
long—until February 2014—to directly notify the general counsel about the 
Cobalt problems, Kemp replied that he did not know.184  Unfortunately, 
what GM needed at this critical juncture in its history was something other 
than a friend. 
But there is an alternative vision—that of “lawyer as gatekeeper.”  This 
vision insists that the GM lawyers could have done otherwise and that it 
was not enough to simply hand off issues to engineering to be resolved by 
them and merely stand by to provide just-in-time legal advice.  This vision 
rejects the proposition that lawyers are there merely to facilitate the 
autonomous decision making of other individuals.  This vision understands 
that serious safety problems are not the problems of someone else but are 
GM’s problems for which the GM lawyers are directly responsible for 
resolving as expeditiously as possible.  Although this vision understands 
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that the GM lawyers, not being engineers, could not have resolved the 
ignition switch defect on their own, they should have assumed ownership of 
the problem before them and not permitted it to languish in dead-end 
investigations and fester as one committee meeting after another got 
postponed.  This vision understands that the GM lawyers should have 
reported the problem to the general counsel years earlier and, if the general 
counsel were not responsive, further escalated the issue up the ladder to the 
board—even if doing so would be perceived as brazen.  This vision 
understands that being an inside lawyer is not a popularity contest and 
certainly not about making friends.  Rather, being an inside lawyer is about 
protecting the organization—even from threats arising from within. 
